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1. 
An entity’s logical character, for Russell and Wittgenstein, 
is a matter of the ways in which it may combine with other 
entities to form atomic facts. Where Russell gives a theory 
of the logical constitution of atomic facts, however, Witt-
genstein asserts that the ways in which entities combine in 
facts can be known only a posteriori through the process 
of analysis.1 Russell was thus mistaken in Wittgenstein’s 
eyes in laying out as he did his logical variety of particulars 
and the various kinds of universal. Pressing the Tractarian 
position, Ramsey claims that we know “nothing whatever 
about the forms of atomic propositions”. We do not know, 
for example, “that there are not atomic facts consisting of 
two terms of the same type” (Ramsey 1990 p29). 
I shall suggest that this Tractarian agnosticism is in 
tension with the Tractarian doctrine that the logico-
syntactic use of a sign determines a logical form. Imagine 
a ‘world’ in which there are only two forms (that is, logical 
types) of object and only one mode of combination, a 
mode in which a single object of each form is combined. 
The symmetry of this world is such that the two object 
forms are internally indistinguishable. The internal 
character of each form is exhausted by its being the form 
of an object whose only possibility for combination is in a 
certain mode with an object of the other form, and the 
internal character of the mode of combination is exhausted 
by its being a mode of combination of one object of each 
form. Wittgenstein’s agnosticism regarding the forms of 
reality means that he cannot say in advance that reality 
does not, like our imagined ‘world’, include distinct but 
internally indistinguishable forms. A logico-syntactic use, 
however, is to determine a logical form by virtue of 
determining the internal nature of that form only. If reality 
turns out to include internally indistinguishable forms it 
follows that the determination as envisaged of logical form 
by logico-syntactic use will not everywhere be possible. 
To bring this concern into focus I want to develop a 
simple, semi-formal account of syntactic use, of form, and 
of the place of syntactic use in the determination of form. 
The account will be appropriately general to accommodate 
Wittgenstein’s ignorance of the nature of the forms of 
reality. I do not claim that the semi-formal work is at every 
point implicit in the Tractatus. Rather, the work is intended 
as an elucidatory model of certain Tractarian ideas. 
2. 
The notion to be developed is of an atomic syntactic sys-
tem. An atomic syntactic system S has: 
a vocabulary V of signs, and 
a set T = {Mj: j∈J} of sign types 
                                                     
 
1 See Wittgenstein 1961 5.55 – 5.5571. See also Wittgenstein 1993 
pp. 29-30 and Wittgenstein 1979 p. 42.) 
where each Mj⊆V and J is an indexing set. Signs here are 
typographically identified marks. Further, the system S 
has: 
a set C of manners of sign combination. 
A manner of sign combination c∈C will be a manner of 
combination of a determinate, finite number of ordered 
signs. The combination in mode c of the signs s1, s2, …, sn 
so ordered is denoted by c(s1, s2, …, sn). Finally for S there 
is, for each manner of combination c∈C, a rule of the form: 
x1∈Mf(c,1), x2∈Mf(c,2), …, xn∈Mf(c,n) ⇔ c(x1, x2, …, xn)∈F 
where f is some (appropriately partial) function from C×ℕ to 
J. Set F is the set of formulae of S; it contains no members 
besides those provided by the system’s rules of combina-
tion. Note that the rules for membership of F have the form 
of equivalences. What is not allowed in a syntactic system 
is, say, c(s,t)∈F and c(u,v)∈F, but c(s,v)∉F. Each position 
in each manner of combination determines a set of signs 
which figure in that position in a formula, and whether or 
not a combination in a mode of C of signs from V is a for-
mula of the system depends on the signs’ positions in the 
combination and their membership of such sets only. 
Next we want to reach an idea of the structure of a 
syntactic system, abstracting away from the signs and 
manners of combination deployed in any particular system 
instantiating that structure. The thought here is that what is 
of structural interest is simply the number of positions 
belonging to each sign type in each manner of 
combination. Thus let’s say: 
X∈T occurs n (≥0) times in combination c if, and 
only if, X=Mj and exactly n of f(c,i) are equal to j 
And with this we make the definition: 
Two atomic syntactic systems S1 and S2 with man-
ners of combination C1 and C2 and sets of syntac-
tic mark-types T1 and T2, are isomorphic if, and 
only if, there exists a bijection α:C1→C2 and a bi-
jection β:T1→T2 such that, for all c∈C1 and X∈T1, 
(X occurs n times in c) ⇔ (β(X) occurs n times in 
α(c)).  
Such a bijection (α,β):C1×T1→C2×T2 is an isomorphism 
from S1 to S2. 
The notion of an atomic syntactic system and its 
structure is now given. Let’s take a look at what its interest 
might be. 
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3. 
An atomic syntactic system is a system of combinations of 
marks. Whether and how certain marks in a system’s vo-
cabulary may combine with each other to make formulae 
of the system depends on what types of marks they are. 
With this in view we could say: a syntactic use of a sign is 
a role that sign has in some syntactic system S as a possi-
ble element of members of F, the set of formulae of S, by 
virtue of its membership of a particular sign type of S. Of 
course, such a use is bound to the modes of combination 
and sign types of S, but this tie is something we can ab-
stract away from. If S1 and S2 are isomorphic systems 
with isomorphism (α,β), then the role a mark has in S1 by 
virtue of its membership of a sign type X of S1 is structur-
ally equivalent to the role in S2 had by a member of β(X) 
by virtue of its membership of that set. And at first glance 
one might think to say here: the two syntactic uses deter-
mine the same form. With its syntactic use in a certain 
system, a sign determines a place in the abstract combina-
torial structure instantiated by that system – it determines a 
form. 
On closer inspection, these last two sentences will 
be seen to be slightly hasty. But let’s not worry about that 
right away. Rather, let’s run with them and look instead at 
a few concrete examples of atomic syntactic systems, 
beginning with the case of a Russellian system. A 
Russellian atomic system has: 
FR = ∪n≥2 {cn(x1, x2, …, xn): x1∈Un-1, x2, …, xn∈P} 
Un here is the set of universal signs of degree n, and P is 
the set of particular signs. In line with traditional scripts, 
one might use P = {‘ai’}, Un = {‘Rni’} and set cn(x1, x2, …, xn) 
to be the combination that the xi are written in order. (Thus 
FR would contain such formulae as ‘R11a1’, ‘R24a1a2’, 
‘R32a5a1a6’.) Of course, many other sign types and combi-
natorial modes could be used; the resulting systems 
would, however, all bear the same structure. 
Systems with structures quite different from the 
Russellian structure can of course be readily concocted. 
Ramsey envisages the possibility of atomic facts 
consisting of two entities of the same type. Forms 
answering to this description would arise within such (non-
isomorphic) systems as S1, S2 and S3 defined by: 
F1 = {c1(x, y): x, y∈A}, 
F2 = {c2(x, y): x, y∈B} ∪ {c3(x, y): x∈C, y∈D }, and 
F3 = {c4(x, y): x, y∈E} ∪ {c5(x, y, z): x∈E, y∈F, z∈F} 
Ramsey’s claim against Russell is that we have no more 
reason to believe that logical forms – the forms of reality – 
are those generated in FR any more than they are those 
generated by such entirely different systems as F1, F2 and 
F3. 
4. 
Pausing on the system S2, an interesting possibility may 
come into view. An atomic syntactic system, one will no-
tice, can be non-trivially self-isomorphic. A mapping 
(α,β):{c2, c3}×{B, C, D}→{c2, c3}×{B, C, D} set to identity 
other than β(C) = D and β(D) = C is an isomorphism from 
S2 to itself. Similarly we might consider a system S4 de-
fined by: 
F4 = {c6(x, y): x, y∈G} ∪ {c7(x, y): x, y∈G} 
This system is again non-trivially self-isomorphic with a 
non-trivial isomorphism taking G to G, c6 to c7, and c7 to 
c6. 
With such possibilities in mind, let’s make a few fur-
ther definitions. Consider a system S with manners of 
combination C and set of sign types T. Then for each t∈T 
and c∈C let 
Λt = {x∈T: there is an isomorphism (α,β):C×T→C×T such that β(t)=x} 
Γc = {x∈C: there is an isomorphism (α,β):C×T→C×T such that α(c)=x} 
From this we may say that a system S with manners of 
combination set C and set of syntactic mark-types T is 
symmetrical with respect to K⊆T if, and only if, there exists 
t∈T such that K=Λt≠{t}. Similarly S is symmetrical with 
respect to L⊆C if, and only if, there exists c∈C such that 
L=Γc≠{c}. If S is not symmetrical with respect to any set 
then S is asymmetrical.2 
How are we to place the possibility of symmetry 
within atomic syntactic systems? Well, Wittgenstein 
envisages the possibility of distinct objects which are 
internally indistinguishable.3 In a similar vein we imagined 
above a ‘world’ (call it W1) in which there are only two 
forms of object and only one mode of combination, a mode 
in which one object of either form is combined. The two 
object forms of this world are distinct but the symmetry of 
the combinatorial situation is such that they are internally 
indistinguishable. Alternatively we could imagine a world 
W2 in which there is a single form of objects and two 
modes of combination, each mode being a mode of 
combination of two objects. Here the two modes are 
distinct but internally indistinguishable. And what is in 
general being imagined with such indistinguishabilities, we 
can see, are precisely worlds whose structures are 
instantiated by symmetric syntactic systems. S4 above, for 
instance, instantiates the structure of W2 and is 
symmetrical with respect to {c6, c7}. The structure of W1 is 
instantiated by a system S5 defined by 
F5 = {c8(x, y): x∈H, y∈I} 
which is symmetrical with respect to {H, I}. 
5. 
It would appear that we should revise the general thought 
above that a sign in use in an atomic syntactic system 
determines a place in the abstract combinatorial structure 
instantiated by that system, that is that it determines a 
form. Take the system S2. This system has a structure 
with three forms; two of these three forms are, however, 
internally indistinguishable. A sign of S2 which is a mem-
ber of B determines as such the distinguishable of these 
three forms; in use as a member of B the sign has that 
form. Members of C and D, however, determine as such 
only the class of the two indistinguishable forms: their syn-
tactic use gives the shared nature of the two forms but 
                                                     
 
2 Note that the Λt and Γc partition T and C respectively. They cover T and C, 
for t∈Λt and c∈Γc (put (α,β) to identity). Next, if sign type q∈Λr∩Λs then there 
exist isomorphisms (α1,β1) and (α2,β2) on S such that β1(r)=β2(s)=q. Then 
(α2-1.α1, β2-1.β1) is an isomorphism on S such that β2-1.β1 (r)=s. (The 
inverse of an isomorphism is an isomorphism (as defined), and the composi-
tion of isomorphisms is an isomorphism.) Now take some u∈Λs. There exists 
an isomorphism (α3,β3) on S such that β3(s)=u. But then (α3.α2-1.α1, β3.β2-
1.β1) is an isomorphism on S such that β3.β2-1.β1(r)=u. Thus u∈Λr and so 
Λs⊆Λr.  Similarly Λr⊆Λs, and so Λr=Λs. In the same way, if there is a mode of 
combination d∈Γe∩Γf then Γe=Γf. 
3 See Wittgenstein 1961 §2.0233. Indeed, he envisages the possibility of two 
entities which are externally as well as internally indistinguishable (Wittgen-
stein 1961 §§2.02331, 5.5302). 
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does not select between them. Noting the possibility of 
such a situation one might move to say that a syntactic use 
determines not a form but a form type. Taking up this de-
scription of the matter one needs, however, to bear in mind 
that the number of ‘tokens’ had by a particular ‘form type’ 
is internal to the type. Where the type has only one token, 
then, the determination is of nothing less than the token. 
In whatever terms one chooses to weaken the 
general claim that syntactic uses determine forms, the 
Tractarian position that a sign in logico-syntactic use 
determines a logical form comes under threat. Wittgenstein 
does not know what the logical forms are; he does not 
know the logical structure of reality. Therefore he does not 
know that the structure of reality is not symmetrical with 
regard to certain object forms. But if reality is so 
symmetrical, a logico-syntactic employment of a sign – that 
is, a syntactic employment of a sign in a system 
instantiating the structure of reality – will not always 
determine a unique logical form. 
The point might be thought to be somewhat 
nitpicking. A logico-syntactic use is guaranteed to 
determine, as said, a ‘form type’, even if it is not certain 
that all logico-syntactic uses will determine a single form. 
Is this not good enough for Wittgenstein? Well I cannot 
here follow through what all the repercussions might be for 
his system if the thesis of the determination of logical form 
by logico-syntactic use is relaxed as mooted. We can 
quickly note, however, that on pain of the possibility of 
nonsense Wittgenstein will have to allow that what one  
 
symbol – that is a sign in logico-syntactic use – can mean 
might depend on what other symbols of the language 
actually mean. To see this note first that two signs in the 
same use may not refer to entities of distinct types: two 
signs in the same use will be intersubstitutable in 
propositions, and so their reference to entities of distinct 
types would entail the possibility of nonsense propositions. 
Now suppose that reality has two internally 
indistinguishable forms. In a language instantiating the 
structure of reality there will, under this supposition, be a 
logico-syntactic use u which determines the type of these 
indistinguishable forms but does not select between them 
(in fact there will be two such uses). A sign in use u will 
not, however, be free to refer to an object of either of these 
two forms: it will, on pain of the possibility of nonsense, be 
constrained to refer only to objects of the same form as 
those referred to by other signs in the same use. 
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